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Transatlantic Cooperation in the War Against Terror Financing:  
Building a Counter-Network 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
  
 
  The terror network seems like the EU of terror, a federation of states in 
    constant expansionary mode.  Every country who wants to join in gets  
    substantial help from Brussels to do so.  (quoted in Napoleoni, p. 157) 
 
  Contemporary terrorism is distinguished, not so much by a command structure, 
but by the extent to which the terror network has permeated the farthest reaches of the 
globe, as well as the most accessible, and is sustained by a vast terror economy.   
Although the costs of lethal materials is not always prohibitive to individual terrorists, the 
costs of sustaining a global movement for the period of incubating and hatching a plot are 
prohibitive to most.  The Council of Foreign Relations began its report describing a new 
threat, 
 
    Unlike other terrorist leaders, Osama bin Laden is not a military hero, a  
    religious authority, or an obvious representative of the downtrodden and  
    disillusioned.  He is a rich financier. 
  So far, eliminating the leaders of terror does not seem to get at the roots of terror.    
Observers have tried to offer metaphors that convey images of the extensive and elusive 
nature of terror financing.  An intuitive journalist likens it to a “financial archipelago with 
connections hidden beneath the surface.”  Tracing the monies reveals the complexity, 
density and adaptability of terror networks.  Despite global cooperation in combating 
terror financing since 9/11, Al Qaeda still boasts about its financial means, promising to 
reward followers in gold for killing Americans in Iraq.  Terror financing reveals a side as 
dark as the wholesale destruction and murder witnessed in the WTC bombing.  It reveals 
the destruction of society at its roots, and the destruction is non-discriminatory, 
corrupting, addicting, prostituting members of the most impoverished to the wealthiest 
societies, the least governed to the best governed states.  Terrorists not only sponsor 
terrorism with their monies, they perpetrate and profit from crimes that are destructive in 
their own right. (Interview at UN, New York, 01/2006)  Stopping the proceeds to crime 
from terror financing is a vital security objective, not often targeted in public discussions 
of the dangers of terrorism. 
  Recent research has argued that “social bonds are the critical element” in the 
process of an individual’s decision to join the jihad and that these contacts “precede 
ideological commitment”. (Sageman, p. 135)  Financial investigation is an incisive tool 
for discovering the breakdown of the social networks and the income that supports 
terrorism, not to mention the identity and location of terrorists.  It is not as costly as other   2
means of gathering intelligence; it can even be considered cheap in comparison to other 
strategies.  The money chase does not carry the political risks and moral dilemmas of 
maintaining prisons and resorting to extreme and possibly illegal and inhumane means of 
extracting information from terror suspects.  Furthermore, as long as countries have the 
desire to counter terror finance, they have the capacities.  Crack investigators, individuals 
that seem to be born into that role, exist in every culture and like to cooperate with each 
other.  Finally, making their financial sources more transparent will prevent people from 
unwittingly contributing to terrorism, especially as charities are exposed that divert funds 
to jihad.  
The main objective of this paper is to make a convincing case for basing the 
campaign to combat terror financing in transatlantic relations.  It is precisely because the 
EU poses itself as a counter-network to terror networks that it qualifies as an 
indispensable partner for the United States.  The EU has global reach, operating a 
political economy with ties and activities in all corners of the world and is constantly 
expanding, internally, as well as increasing external contacts.  Extraordinary benefits 
flow from European integration, significantly, the legal ties that bind EU member states 
with each other and third countries.  This paper maintains supranationalism has created 
relationships that are qualitatively different from those based on the ad hoc bargaining of 
traditional diplomacy, relationships that are so well-defined and practiced that they can 
overcome bureaucratic obstacles and provide flexibility for institutional and policy 
innovation.  The roots of the EU have grown deep.  Collectively, member countries 
promote values that have gained appeal internationally, for example, respect for 
individual human rights and adherence to international law, and enabled Europe to 
exercise the influence of an opinion leader internationally while it controls a numerically 
strong voting bloc in international fora (one that is growing stronger given the 
attractiveness of many EU policy positions). 
 
  The EU offers a partner who can enlarge the pool of assets available.   
Transatlantic cooperation adds to advanced technologies critical to tracking down terror 
monies.  Equally important, structures and processes of government that supply capacity 
to law enforcement, intelligence services and judiciaries are most reliable in these 
advanced countries.  Indeed, coordinating the activities of this dense web of institutions 
required in the financial campaign requires sophistication unknown in the majority of 
states in the world.  It is not enough for the EU and the U.S. to be able to implement 
policies on their own to counter terror finance.  Anywhere terrorists decide to enrich 
themselves, states must be able to use legislative, legal and judicial tools to defeat them.  
Therefore, a strategy of the United Nations has been to enlist developed states in 
capacity-building where it is needed.  Indeed, the EU and U.S. have enough excess 
capacity, including financial resources, to assist states that are dysfunctional or lacking in 
their basic functions.  They also have shared experience in regional and international 
institutions with nation-building, a mission for which the EU has equipped itself and 
considers a legitimate exercise of power outside of its borders.  EU enlargement to the 
East and preparations for subsequent expansion offer a model for nation-building.  By the 
same token, the EU and United States have cooperated in NATO enlargement and 
programs that link non-members to the organization, especially Partnership for Peace.  
Transatlantic cooperation needs to build on these experiences to enhance learning and to   3
extend efforts to help weak states develop capacities to fight terror where they are sorely 
lacking.   
 
  In the final analysis, it makes sense for the United States to enlist allies in efforts 
with which they agree and to build cooperation where a strong basis already exists in 
shared institutions, commonality of values and political traditions, and previous 
experience pursuing joint endeavors.  From the start of the war against terror, former 
Secretary of the Treasury Paul O’Neill underscored that “the financial campaign against 
terrorism is as important as the militia campaign.” 
(http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/usinfo/terror/2001/100301.htm)  As the military 
instrument looks increasingly like a blunt instrument, it is important to martial all the 
resources of state in the war against terror.  Going after the lifelines of terrorists offers 
many advantages.  Mainly, the instruments used include strengthening the rule of law and 
developing effective institutions from which societies in the grips of terrorists and their 
pernicious activities stand to gain.    
 
Scope and Nature of Transatlantic Cooperation in the Financial Campaign 
 
  The EU and United States were not devoid of measures for combating terror 
financing before 9/11.  To the contrary, the amount of preparation is surprising 
considering that a consensus did not exist on what priority to give the threat.  Efforts 
before 9/11 were not sustained; however, institutional preparation meant that structures 
could be activated and expanded to avail and previous thinking could inform desperate 
decision-makers in the United States who sought to impose calm and a sense of control. 
  
  Elements of a collective security strategy against the terror economy had been put 
in place during the second Clinton term.  In reaction to the bombings of U.S. embassies 
in Tanzania and Kenya, August 1998, the United States retaliated with a cruise missile 
attack against al Qaeda training camps in tandem with Executive Order 13099, setting in 
train a sanctions regime against Osama bin Laden.  According to Clarke, 
 
    With these orders, the focus of U.S. strategy moved from a narrow 
    approach focused primarily on law enforcement to a wider approach that  
    aimed to bring into the fight all the varied tools and resources of the U.S.  
    government.  (Clarke, p. 190) 
 
  The United States took the case for sanctions against Afghanistan, including a 
plan to freeze the assets of associates of Osama bin Laden, to the UN.  The United States 
worked hand in hand with Russia, a partner who had grown more willing as it watched 
the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia and even suspected “the Taliban of 
involvement in the war in Chechnya.” (Crossette)  Cooperation between Russia and the 
United States was so close it was conducted at working group level, the first meeting 
taking place, May, 2001.  Security Council members France and Britain went along with 
the sanctions.  However, France, having pressed for a terminal date for the Iraq sanctions 
regime, agreed to the new sanctions against Afghanistan only on the condition they 
would be reviewed in a year. (Hunter)  Both European countries were sympathetic to   4
U.S. concerns about terrorism, having each experienced long and continuing struggles 
with terrorist group in their own countries. 
 
  Significantly, the Security Council passed the UNSCR 1267 (i.e., the sanctions 
regime) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, thus, carrying the effect that all members 
of the UN were legally bound to cooperate with resolution.  Under the Security Council, 
a Sanctions Committee was set-up to implement the regime.  A 2004 review of progress 
in combating terror financing lauded the viability of this international effort, stating, “The 
1267 Sanction committee’s work is the most focused multilateral effort to combat the 
funding of terrorists and their supporters.” (“Strategic Goal 1: Counter Terrorism,” 
http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/perfplan/2004/20462) 
 
  EU member countries were out in front implementing the committee’s instruction 
to freeze the assets of named associates of Osama bin Laden.  To effect the decision, they 
put the necessary regulation through the Council of Ministers in March 2001 and, 
collectively, implemented the freeze.  For its part, the United States would wait to freeze 
the assets of five associates on the UN list until after 9/11.         
 
  In conjunction with new institutions and policy, new international law was also 
created during this period.  The UN concluded a Treaty to Suppress Terror Financing, 
signed December 1999, bringing the number of treaties to combat terror to twelve.  Once 
in force after twenty-two ratifications, Article 18 of the Treaty legally obligated states “to 
prevent and counter preparations in their respective territories” related to terror financing.  
This obligation extended to concrete steps, for example, states’ mandating “know your 
customer” policies, adopting reporting techniques, and reporting suspect transactions 
(Art. 18, para b).  Article 24 enables the International Court of Justice to step in, 
ultimately, to resolve an impasse between states in utilizing the Treaty.  U.S. financial 
institutions would not be required to instate customer vigilance until the Patriot Act, post-
9/11.  Furthermore, U.S. distrust of international courts is legend with the country’s 
staunch resistance to the International Criminal Court.  Overcoming traditional cultural 
and political concerns, the United States capitalized on a changed mood in the Senate, the 
ratifying body.  The Bush administration achieved Senate approval of the UN Treaty to 
Suppress Terror Financing, and led an international effort to convince countries to ratify 
all of the Treaties concerned with the threat of terrorism.  As of the start of 2004, among 
EU countries, UK, Denmark, Spain, Netherlands, Italy, France, Austria, Finland, and 
Cyprus had signed all twelve treaties, whereas Germany, Greece, Sweden and Lithuania 
had signed all but one. 
 
  In the immediate wake of the WTC bombings, the EU demonstrated what can be 
termed without exaggeration, unconditional support for the United States in the war 
against terror.  On 20 September 2001, transatlantic leaders issued a “Joint U.S.-EU 
Statement on Combating Terrorism” in which they resolved, “We will mount a 
comprehensive, systematic and sustained effort to eliminate international terrorism – its 
leaders, its actions, its networks.”   The Washington Post reported an example of “no 
questions asked” cooperation from the EU. 
   5
  In the aftermath of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, the council [Council of 
  Ministers] backed an American initiative to add scores of names to a list of more 
  than 260 individuals and organizations that are targeted by the sanctions.  At the 
  time, the United States supplied virtually no evidence to support its claims. 
  (“Easing Sanctions on Bin Laden Associates”) 
 
As the war on terror was declared, the Danes were in the presidency of the EU and were 
forthcoming in their support.  They directed EU efforts by establishing an EU 
clearinghouse to freeze additional terror assets under UNSCR 1267 and were so far-
reaching that they even extended the freeze to entities and people beyond the list the 
United States sponsored.  (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/20144.pdf)  EU 
member countries continued their efforts.  They adopted a common definition of 
terrorism, essential for swift extradition of terrorists and common policing.   A legal 
definition of terrorism was unprecedented in the large majority of EU member countries.  
Prior to 9/11, criminal statutes covered terrorism in only six EU member countries, 
Germany, Italy, France, Britain, Portugal and Spain  (“EU moves to Tighten Anti-Terror 
Laws.”)  Adoption of the Common Arrest Warrant proceeded immediately, speeded up 
by the fact it had been in the works for several years.  After an initial meeting of the 
European Council, following the WTC assault in September 2001, Justice and Home 
Affairs ministers produced a framework decision on the Common Arrest Warrant, 13 
June 2002.  The decades-old experience with terrorism in those countries evidently 
yielded lessons.  For example, the British Government was able to claim that the decision 
would serve to “bring the rest of the EU up to the standard of the UK.” 
(http://www.publications.parliament.uk/cgi-bin/uk_parl&Stemmer=en&W...) 
     
  Individually, EU member countries used their influential membership in 
multilateral organizations to support U.S. policy.  The centerpiece of international efforts 
has been UNSCR 1373 and its implementing structure, the UN Counter-Terrorism 
Committee (CTC), chaired by the British representative to the UN, Sir Jeremy 
Greenstock.  The committee has made considerable contributions in helping UN 
members reform internal legislation (i.e. capacity-building) to combat terror, especially in 
the financial realm, and in monitoring progress.  As the resolution supporting this 
committee was passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, member countries of the UN 
are bound to implement the decisions of the committee, for example, required mandatory 
reports every ninety days on measures taken to comply with UN standards in combating 
terror.  Despite this potential for action, the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs in the 
UK determined at the end of 2002, “the UN has little capacity to enforce Resolution 
1373” and, consequently, “is essentially reliant upon its more powerful members.”  The 
EU has addressed this political gap to some extent, linking agreements with Third 
countries to their cooperation with efforts to combat terror.  The United States reported 
the following observation to the CTC, 19 December 2001, 
 
    The U.S. and European Union have developed unprecedented cooperation  
    on counterterrorism since September 11, including close cooperation on  
    the freezing of the assets of terrorists and their supporters, as well as  
  increased  assistance  in  investigations and the sharing of information…   6
  ( http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rpt/2001/6917.htm) 
 
  Furthermore, the CTC was seen to be of so much value to members of the 
Security Council, another resolution, UNSCR 1535, was passed in 2004 to give to the 
committee more ability to do its work. 
(http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/cted.html)  The United States has been 
especially supportive of strengthening this committee. (Interview at the UN, New York, 
01/2006)  The U.S. willingness to cede so much authority to a UN institution should be 
seen as an example of “situational supranationalism”, which will be discussed in more 
detail later.  As a member of the UN, the United States is also subject to that committee 
within its mandate.  The main reform in 2004 to increase capacity was to create the 
Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), which meets every week 
and has always been chaired by a member of the EU.  Having a member of the EU in the 
high profile position allows the United States to use its influence behind the scene and 
not be seen as trying to coopt the committee.  
 
Adding to European influence in the UN, Germany joined the Security Council as 
a non-permanent member for a two-year term beginning 2003 and had a turn chairing the 
top body.  In other contexts, Germany assumed the chair of the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF) in 2002, the international organization that oversees the global campaign 
against terror financing, especially the money laundering component.  This body is 
primarily comprised of members from Europe and the Americas.  The officials who 
cooperate in this sector have shown policy fluency, innovation and efficiency that are not 
seen in more politicized institutions.  The responsiveness and adaptability of the FATF 
depends on shared technical understandings among officials that provide a distinct 
culture as the bases for productive relationships and cooperation.  
 
Europeans also play a prominent role in the G-8, an organization that quickly 
adapted to the new post-9/11 environment and has played an essential role in defining 
broad international policies for countering terror.  Through annual summits that bring 
together heads of government of the most advanced economies and the President of the 
EU Commission, meetings of finance ministers and their officials, the G-8 combines both 
political capacity and the specialization needed to monitor and assist the financial 
campaign.  EU member countries make up half of the membership of the G-8, and in 
cooperation with either Canada or Russia, which happens often, a majority. 
 
Another institutional setting that has increasingly provided opportunities for 
cooperation on terror finance is the EU-U.S transatlantic dialogue that culminates in 
annual summits.  Whereas summits are the occasion for setting priorities and 
spearheading action in specific policy areas, regular work takes place at official level.  
The financing of terror was identified as a priority at the summit level in September 2004 
and has continued as a specific dialogue in which informal cooperation takes place on 
multiple levels from working groups of officials to high-ranking members of the U.S. 
Treasury, State Department, European Commission, Presidency and Council Secretariat.  
The informal nature of cooperation allows for the participation of organizations that 
otherwise are guarded in their operations, for example, Europol and the FBI.  The flexible   7
nature of this framework allows for technical-legal projects, such as the drafting of texts 
to enhance cooperation and to serve as models for other countries.  At the same time, the 
existence of a set structure facilitates more fluid exchanges of information and ad hoc 
operational cooperation.   
 
  Despite so many factors favorable to transatlantic cooperation, serious problems 
remain.  This is especially the case with information-sharing.  Law enforcement against 
the financial plots of terrorists hinges more than anything else on effective collection and 
use of intelligence.  The disposition to share intelligence has had to be cultivated from the 
ground up.  At the outset of the war on terror, few countries in the world had established 
the trust, much less the necessity, to share information.  U.S. intelligence has traditionally 
operated on a “need to know” standard, which in practice, translates into most countries 
not needing to know.  The exception has been Britain’s “special relationship” with the 
United States, of which an important dimension has been intelligence cooperation.   
Individually, EU countries have been as prone to national territorialism on intelligence 
issues.  Post-9/11, a journalist observed, “If Britain and Belgium are sharing information 
on a certain individual, they may not know if Portugal’s got a file on him.” (Burgess) 
Nonetheless, transatlantic intelligence cooperation had modest beginnings before 9/11.  
NATO actions in the Balkans had required crossing national intelligence boundaries, 
albeit cooperation was limited to the mission.  Within the EU, France and Spain had 
developed close cooperation “out of common concern over the Basque separatist group 
ETA, which operates along their border.”  Despite examples of highly selective 
cooperation and an observable overall improvement since 9/11, many voices have been 
raised that cooperation has not gone far enough and that obstacles persist.  A common 
complaint of Europeans is that cooperation is not reciprocated by the United States.  A 
European official was quoted, “If you call sharing a one-way street, then we share 
information.  He further lamented, “They [United States] want what we have 
immediately, and demand it.  But if we ask for something, it can take months before we 
even get an initial reply.” (Farah and Eggen) 
 
  Reciprocity is a practice in international relations that has been able to facilitate 
cooperation, especially with trade agreements.  As of yet, this practice has not established 
itself in relations on countering terror financing.  For example, it is notably absent in the 
extradition agreement concluded between the UK and the United States, in which the 
latter is the only one to receive assurances that suspected terrorists will be extradited 
without a judge’s intervention. (Blitz)  The United States does not possess relations as 
“special” with other EU countries to be able to achieve agreements as “unequal”.    
 
  Bureaucratic inertia has been another problem that has interfered with 
transatlantic efforts.  A problem inherent to bureaucracies is compounded when these 
structures have to learn new functions.  While trying to navigate their own “fences and 
layers”, bureaucracies have had to span across continents to tie into, yet, more fences and 
layers. (Betts, p. 6)   In addition, they have had to communicate in ways never attempted 
before and in ways even prohibited in the past. 
   8
  The Common Arrest Warrant in the EU was plagued by a combination of 
bureaucratic foot-dragging and political hesitancy from the start.  It had been under 
consideration for two years before 9/11 and only pushed to conclusion by that tragedy.  
Even given the more urgent focus, the decision became hostage to one member, Italy, 
who held out for a delay.  Once over that hurdle, Germany found itself pressing for 
delays in implementation.  March 2004, Burgess reports five EU member countries had 
failed to fully implement the program. (Burgess)  The press coverage of the financial 
campaign makes many references to delayed policies and missed deadlines.  
 
  That the financial actions against terror are nested in bureaucracies largely hidden 
from public view has both advantages and disadvantages.  The main advantage is the 
issues are located in permanent institutional contexts.  Unlike more politicized issues, 
progress does not depend on capturing the political agenda.  So much of the work has to 
do with adapting processes and structures, issue publics either do not understand or care 
to understand.  These are the same issues officials are content to nurture along.  However, 
to keep the momentum of the financial campaign, public inattention may deny officials 
much needed political support for their efforts, as well as accountability. 
 
  The conception of “more bureaucracy,” as a result of the terror threat, is one that 
is hard to accept in the present political climate in the United States.  A bureaucracy that 
functions as it is supposed to needs a new appreciation in the age of terror.  As a 
consensus builds that “failed states” are dangerous to international security, it has to be 
remembered that states fail partly because they lack functional bureaucracies or possess 
ones riddled with corruption.  One cannot deny the fact that bureaucracies are going to 
have to grow to face-off against an enemy, networked and chameleon-like, one that 
changes not only the way it presents itself but the way it sources itself.  So, it seems 
governments are going to have to expand their tentacles to airports, financial institutions, 
national borders and cyberspace, and intertwine them with like-minded governments.  In 
the United States, absorbing this reality in an anti-government political season, where 
globalization looked to promise more instead of less freedom, has already required a 
political volte-face.  Even for seasoned bureaucrats, a dilemma is produced by the need 
for new structures and processes and the need to bring the old system more efficient 
control.  According to an informed observer, “Many professionals suffocating under the 
intertia of a sprawling intelligence bureaucracy think the community badly needs 
streamlining.” (Betts, p. 6)  The international bureaucratization process, the link-up with 
the bureaucracies of international and regional organizations, requires more than an 
adjustment in conceptions; it requires thinking anew.  For the EU, the reckoning is also 
difficult, but it has been conditioned by the incremental development over a half-century 
of supranational, authoritative institutions and, in a political context more influenced by 
social democracy, an acceptance of government responsibilities.     
 
  One thing is certain, bureaucratic obstacles are sure to exist if the overriding 
political climate is one of disagreement.  Transatlantic foreign policy divisions and 
divergent approaches indisputably interfere with cooperation on combating terror 
financing.  Consider, for instance, the policy of freezing the assets of charities that divert 
funds to terrorists.  Although the United States and EU had a consensus on the overall   9
policy objective, they initially diverged in their identification of suspect charities.  The 
EU was hesitant to punish charities that assisted Palestinians, in keeping with the belief 
that the roots of terror in the region could be found in misery and exclusion, even given 
the proof they were involved in sponsoring terror against Israel.  Albeit wary of imposing 
more hardship on the Palestinian people, the EU finally complied with the U.S. 
designation of some of the charities as terror organizations.  When Hamas succeeded in 
Palestinian elections in February 2006, the EU and U.S. coordinated their approaches 
closely based on multilateral cooperation in a group known as the Quartet, comprising 
EU, UN, U.S., and Russia.  
 
  Another issue on which differences have emerged has to do with the priority 
human rights should be assigned in the war on terror.  The relationship between human 
rights and the war on terror has significant implications.  The UN emphasizes the high 
priority of strengthening this relationship.  Specifically, in the financial campaign this 
issue has emerged in the form of persons who have ended up with their assets frozen and 
as they are left waiting to be convicted of a crime.  An exemption on a humanitarian basis 
has been agreed to allow individuals to draw down on their accounts for personal 
maintenance expenses while they wait for resolution.  By the same token, humanitarian 
concerns have affected the conclusion of extradition agreements, in that European 
countries are opposed to extraditing suspects who might face capital punishment.  This 
issue had to be worked at the highest political levels between the United States and 
Germany.  Indeed, a compromise was not reached until October 2003, according to 
German Justice Minister Brigitte Zypries, with the conditions, 
 
    When there is a question of a death penalty, we can withhold evidence or  
    the results of an investigation.  We only provide it if we are sure this bit of 
    information will not yield the death penalty and the U.S. has agreed to this 
  formulation.  (Boustany) 
 
  There is no way to assess the impact the largest disagreements, those concerning 
the Bush administration’s embrace of unilateralism and, relatedly, the use of force in Iraq, 
have had on transatlantic efforts to rout out terrorists and their monies.  Suffice it to say, 
when the Bush administration came into office determined to conduct a review of 
sanctions policy and other international commitments, against the background of 
dismissing the multilateral approach, progress on countering the financing of terror 
ground to a halt. 
  
  The “unprecedented” level of transatlantic cooperation described above seems to 
have been motivated by the determination of the United States, by plans previously on 
the drawing boards and the adaptability of a variety of institutional contexts in which 
transatlantic cooperation already took place.  In addition, Europeans were motivated by 
genuine sympathy with the plight of the United States, a plight they were not sure they 
fully shared until the Madrid bombings in 2004.  In the interim between terrorist attacks 
in New York and Madrid, steely resolve dissipated.  That pattern could be repeated again 
as other concerns of state surface and memories of destruction fade.  However, the United  10
States and the EU would be well advised to maximize their cooperation in the financial 
campaign while a window of opportunity exists to collectively out-network the terrorists. 
 
 
Counter-terrorism Requires a Counter-network  
 
One advantage of contemporary terrorists derives from their roots in traditional societies.  
They are creatures of societies intimately connected on a personal basis and constructed 
on “trust” that enables networks to expand beyond face-to-face contacts, with global 
communications, on any scale.  The hawala  system that is so useful to terrorists in 
transferring monies for which no trail of transactions exist is only accessible to insiders, 
only penetrable by intelligence that replicates the relations that connect the informal 
system.  Experience in the United States of relations on the ground in these traditional 
societies is so limited that key departments did not even know about the age-old existence 
of such informal systems of financial exchange. 
 
  The networked nature of terrorism that spans the globe insulates terrorists from 
accountability to any “public”.  Crenshaw and Love make an insightful point, 
 
  Because terrorist groups are increasingly networked globally, with 
  training, recruitment, financing and operations carried out in several 
  countries, increased deaths of one country’s citizens may not reduce 
  sympathy, support, and recruitment for the group in other countries.” 
            (p. 127) 
 
Whereas states in their policies are still dependent on domestic politics, terror networks 
are entirely unaccountable.  Much of the freedom of maneuver of terrorists and increasing 
potency of attacks comes from the elusive, unidentifiable network.     
 
 
  Building networks is not so natural to more modern states.   Post-materialist 
societies only possess remnants of natural trust and, therefore, must build their relations 
in other ways.  As an organization constructed on complicated transnational links 
throughout the EU and with Third countries, not to mention links with international and 
non-governmental organizations, the EU exists amidst a variety of ties that bind, ranging 
from informal to legal ones.  Like the terrorists, the modus operandi of EU is networking.  
Scholars have long commented on the “density” of the EU owing to the myriad of 
officials and politicians caught up in its workings, the frequency of their interactions, and 
commonality of purpose.  The term “eurocrat” implies that a specific identification 
attaches to the organization.  EU expert Helen Wallace states, “For some time, networks 
have been a preferred way of describing the character of decision-making and policy 
development in the EU,” referencing Héritier and Peterson in this regard. (Wallace, p. 
339)  She suggests the term, “intensive transgovernmentalism,” and to justify her term of 
art, explains in EU decision-making “the volume and density of activity is considerable.”  
Extensive contacts not only exist on the level of elites.  Reflecting on the work of 
Markens Jachtenfuchs, Wallace makes the following observation,  11
 
    European governance is a more fluid and malleable set of ways in which  
    governments in the regular meaning of the term – from the participating  
    countries interact with a wide variety of political, societal, and economic  
    actors to respond to pressures and demands for public policy and for  
  political  aggregation  or  arbitration. (Wallace, p. 337) 
 
  Another quality of the EU network is that it is expansionary.  Traditionally, when 
countries have operated in an expansionary mode, they have used their military strength 
to conquer territory or to influence other countries to acquiesce in their policies.  The EU, 
a late-comer militarily, has gone about it differently, utilizing an approach which is now 
generally recognized as “soft power,” based on the seminal work of Nye.  Using the 
language of Nye, the EU uses methods that are designed more “to attract” than to punish 
or threaten.  It has adopted the posture of a “role model,” for example in its oft-stated 
adherence to international norms and law.  The Danish presidency revealed this preferred 
role, stating that in countering terror, “it is our ambition that the EU should become the 
standard-bearer in the UN and other international fora.”  The EU has also tried to convert 
economic assistance into a tool in the arsenal of countering terror.  The high-level expert 
report, “NATO’s Role in Confronting International Terrorism”, recognized the link in EU 
policy between fighting terror and economic relations with non-EU countries, 
maintaining, 
 
  Part of the EU’s efforts to deal with terrorism in surrounding countries includes 
  providing aid and in particular, building on the Barcelona Process, which 
  promotes economic and social development in nearby Mediterranean countries 
  in order to achieve a more stable and peaceful region.  (Clarke & McCaffrey, p. 
38) 
 
  A self-stated goal of the EU in its Plan of Action, March 2004, to combat terror is 
“to ensure that specific counter-terrorism issues are a key element of EU relations at all 
levels with priority countries”.  (reproduced in Clarke & McCaffrey, p. 39)  
 
  The capacity of the EU to effectively conduct “soft power” is large; it matches the 
criteria Nye considers gives countries advantages in mustering soft power.  Nye remarks 
the countries privileged are “those with multiple channels of communication,” “whose 
dominant culture and ideas are closer to prevailing global norms,” and “whose credibility 
is enhanced by their domestic and international values and policies.”  (Nye, pp. 31-32) 
In the soft power game of countering terror financing, the same advantages accrue. 
 
    The challenge, as stated by G-7 finance ministers in Dubai, September  
    2003, is to improve co-operation and information sharing – both within  
    individual countries and across national borders, among law enforcement  
  agencies,  supervisory  authorities,  financial intelligence units and other  
    operational arms. (Nogran and Carauna) 
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The challenge, then, is to build a network that enables the coalition to put down human 
intelligence in any part of the world, to increase the number of states who identify with 
the interests of the leaders against terror, and to legislate and enforce laws universally 
that snare the terrorists. 
 
  Forming political networks goes against the grain of traditional national interests.  
Whereas businesses have found it necessary to network to gain comparative advantages 
in global markets, states have been late to take advantage of networking to achieve goals 
internationally.  Businesses routinely expose themselves to the risks of forming networks: 
 
    When companies enter into networks, they give up some of the 
    control they enjoy in markets.  They have to share knowledge, make 
    their operations transparent, and allow their partners to know a lot 
    more about how they conduct business.  In short, they give up some 
    of their autonomy to become part of an extended commercial  
    activity.  In the process, they become exposed and vulnerable. 
  (Rifkin,  p.  187) 
 
  However, guarding this vulnerability becomes a lower priority to pursuing the 
benefits of networking.  Vulnerability, if it serves to bind the partners, may be converted 
to an asset. 
 
    In a network, vulnerability is considered a strength, not a weakness, 
    a signal of trust and a willingness to work together to everyone’s 
    mutual benefit. (Rifkin, p. 187) 
 
  The same benefits can accrue to out-networking the terrorists.  Whereas networks 
reduce “lead time in getting new products and services out the door”, they also can speed 
up the prosecution of a suspected terrorist that requires evidence-sharing. (Rifkin, p. 190)  
One such prosecution was known to have been held up because reams of German 
documents overwhelmed translation capabilities in the United States.  Intelligent 
collection and analysis may also be done more efficiently as joint working methods 
become established among national services, which, after all, have the same interests in 
survival. 
 
The Advantages of the EU as a Network:  Supranationalism and Surveillance 
 
At first sight, proposing a transatlantic counter-network may not seem a novel idea.  After 
all, the traditional defense alliance brings independent, sovereignty-conscious countries 
together for collective security.  Why not rely primarily on NATO for counter-terrorism?  
The network this paper considers is distinct as it builds on the twin strengths of the EU – 
supranationalism and surveillance- therefore, modeling itself on the EU way of 
cooperation. 
 
  Potentially, the prospect of supranationalism, if it is seen as an infringement on 
sovereignty, could rule out the participation of the United States.  However,  13
supranationalism may be a more manageable set of relations than elites in the United 
States have believed.  True, EU member countries have engaged in a form of 
supranationalism that may be considered “devolved supranationalism”, in that EU 
governments have voluntarily given up power to EU institutions. (Johnston, p. 27)   
Devolved supranationalism is an extended process that requires adaptations on the part of 
national institutions.  The powers that have been transferred are so extensive and cover so 
many policy areas that the arrangement has gained a semi-permanent character.   
Theoretically, since sovereignty remains in national institutions, devolution allows for 
powers to be withdrawn from EU institutions.  The reality, nonetheless, is that EU 
member countries share the same context of interdependence, have entered together into 
future commitments, and have seen their relations increasingly institutionalized over 
more than a half-century of experience with European integration.  The cumulative effect 
is that they share a dense complex of relationships that tends to be progressive and 
enduring.  As explained below, an alternative that may better suit the political culture of 
the United States is one of “situational supranationalism”. 
 
  Clearly, U.S. foreign policy does not favor relationships that “tie and bind”, and 
since 9/11 has become even less tolerant of what elites perceive as constraints on the 
country’s power.  Obviously, the unilateral lurch the Bush administration has directed 
was to increase the scope of action of the United States.  The case of transatlantic 
cooperation to counter terror financing is all the more interesting as it demonstrates 
cooperation that was maintained even as broader transatlantic foreign policy relations 
declined in the face of the Iraq war.  Cooperation in the financial campaign against terror 
is a good example of situational supranationalism.  In a world in which transnational 
issues threaten national security and economic stability, countries, including the United 
States, often choose to cooperate by giving their consent to specific transfers of 
decisional authority, in some cases, even creating a supranational institution for the 
purpose at hand.  The limits and scope of cooperation are carefully delimited, to the 
extent countries may even prescribe objectives to be achieved or deadlines for their joint 
efforts to be completed.  The case of transatlantic cooperation in countering terror finance 
is replete with examples of situational supranationalism which the United States has 
welcomed, and, which far from limiting the scope of U.S. capabilities, has expanded 
them. 
 
  Supranationalism in the EU, not only has provided the member governments with 
more capacity for common decisionmaking and action, but according to Mark Leonard, 
has increased their power in a transformative fashion.  Instead of wielding the power of 
“spectacle,” in reference to the power the United States prefers, they now wield the 
power of “surveillance”. (Leonard, p. 39)  Leonard refers to the EU regulatory and legal 
regimes that determine the behavior of citizens in Europe.  He continues, “Europeans 
understand that the key to their success is the fact that their surveillance is voluntary and 
mutual.” (Leonard, p. 26)  It is also subject to the rule of law, understood in both 
European and American legal traditions as law that is known to the public and applied 
equally.  Whereas the temptation in the war against terror is to resort to secrecy so that 
we do not alert terrorists to our plans and to make extraordinary laws for our enemies, the 
strength of the surveillance society is that citizens understand and recognize the need for  14
rules and become complicit in ordering their societies while believing that the great hope 
is that the rule of law is applied universally.  Surveillance, as Leonard has conceived it, 
depends on democratic legitimacy where it gathers its force. 
 
  As we have seen, international cooperation on countering terror finance has 
benefited from the rule-bound nature of the EU.  Although the negotiations that precede 
regulations in the EU are difficult and can be protracted, once in place, they are enacted 
by twenty-five countries.  They have “automaticity”, as they do not require national 
implementing legislation, and they have legal authority and all that implies, especially 
democratic legitimacy. (Interview with UN official, New York, 01/2006)   
Supranationalism, to the extent it provides surveillance, not to mention how much it 
benefits international cooperation, may be one of the most convenient tools in the war 
against terrorism, and, ironically, one of the most efficient owing to its legal impact.  
Whereas the United States has been skeptical of international cooperation because 
negotiations are time-consuming while the threats are urgent, supranational cooperation 
as the EU practices it demonstrates efficiency that even the United States may find 
difficult to emulate given the complexity of U.S. government, how politicized it has 
become not to mention regular interdepartmental and other kinds of “turf” disputes.                 
 
 
  In conclusion, whereas a consensus has developed that “failed states” are the 
breeding ground of terror, awareness needs to develop that “functional states” possess the 
best means of countering terror.  Such states not only need to be “role models’ but 
stewards of distressed and undeveloped states.  Whereas allies in the past were 
appreciated as “force” multipliers, it must be realized that security depends on more than 
force.  Allies bring to the table a new set of tools.  They serve as multipliers of 
intelligence, state capacity and relations.  European allies have pioneered a new form of 
international cooperation, supranational cooperation, that provides legal authority and the 
power of surveillance.   In short, they have created a network that is the closest thing to 
“natural” that advanced states have to offer.  Seen in the light of the financial campaign, 
transatlantic relations present an incomparable set of relations for prosecuting terror. 
 
Epilogue 
 
As I write, January 2006, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco is a leading member of a 
delegation to the Netherlands to view the Dutch system of flood control.  The delegation 
is looking for lessons on how to plan levies in New Orleans to prevent another Katrina-
like disaster.  The reflex in the United States until now has been how strong and how high 
the levies should be to keep out the flood.  The Dutch innovated a different approach 
after their Katrina, a devastating flood that engulfed Rotterdam in 1953.  They shifted 
their attention away from levies and implemented what has been described as “an 
elaborate  network (my italics) of dikes, man-made islands and 11/2-mile stretch of 
floodgates”. (http://www.netherlands-
embassy.org/article.asp?articleref=AR00001823EN, 13 January 2006)  In short, the 
Dutch approach is more systematic, relying less on strength than smart technology that 
relies on relevancies and interconnections in places difficult to imagine if the objective is  15
to stop the water at the city gates.  Indeed, the Dutch say they no longer have to raise the 
dikes at Rotterdam. 
  
  A student of European politics for over two decades, I realize the vision is also 
different.  The approach that focuses on levies is intensively place-bound, almost 
obsessively focused, to the detriment of the whole picture.  The alternative approach that 
devises flood control away from the place to be protected may be termed “global” and 
suggests more wide-ranging and open examination of possibilities. 
  
  The possibilities in flood control may serve as a metaphor for security in an age of 
global terror and shed light on the crossed-perspectives that have damaged transatlantic 
relations since 9/11.  Take the most controversial of terror-related issues, the war in Iraq.  
The United States termed its own approach, “shock and awe” and derided the approach of 
Europeans who wanted more time to try the UN inspection regime.  No matter how 
frustrating and flawed the UN inspection regime, there can be no doubt it succeeded in 
defusing tensions and reducing Iraq’s military capabilities.  After the Iraq War, tensions 
are inflamed in the Muslim world and the desire of every enemy of the United States is to 
gain more destructive capabilities.  Raising the “levies” in Iraq has not provided the 
security the United States desires. 
  
  The article above argues that the best way of countering terrorism is through 
constructing a transatlantic network that functions by integrating specific counter-
terrorism functions.  The United States can accept this power sharing with Europe if, 
indeed, it reframes its participation as a source of strength and broadens its concept of 
power beyond military power.             
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